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of the Chavez government in Venezuela, and the extension of its influence in the
region, notably through the ALBA group.
9
See Climate Change Secretariat Webcast, at http://cop15.meta-fusion.com/
kongresse/cop15/templ/archive.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=unfccc.
10 In a precedent that no doubt inspired the procedural strategy adopted in
Copenhagen, the Geneva Ministerial Declaration was instead taken note of, and
appended to the COP 2 report.
11 “CMP” refers to the COP, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol. The COP President also serves as CMP President.
12 See Climate Change Secretariat Webcast, supra note 9.
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13 See decision -/CP.15, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/
items/5257.php.
14 See Climate Change Secretariat Webcast, supra note 9.
15 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
countries.
16 Decision -/CP.15, “Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention”, available at http://unfccc.
int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php.
17 Although, as an oil producer, Venezuela does feature among the top 30
emitters.

3. Success or Failure?
by Richard L. Ottinger*
The Copenhagen Climate Conference and its Copenhagen Accord have generally been billed by the press as
having been a failure. I think this is a very unfortunate
mischaracterisation. The conference was a failure only
in not achieving binding commitments to reduce global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels sufficiently to
meet the requirements identified by the some 3,000
leading global scientists of the UN International Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) to avoid disastrous consequences – such as sea-level rise leading to massive
migration, food disruption, water shortages, tropical
disease migration, biodiversity destruction, etc. But the
conference didn’t expect that this could occur in the midst
of a global recession. The timing of these events was
highly unfortunate. But a great deal was accomplished to
lay a good foundation for a future agreement. The years
of hard work by many international, national, municipal,
industrial and academic experts resulted in some very
significant results.
First, the coming together of 193 nations to address the
global climate challenge was unprecedented. The participation of the rapidly developing countries of China, India,
Brazil and South Africa who, with the US, negotiated the
final Accord, and the agreement by Mexico to host the
next climate conference were very important, particularly
in view of the fact that they had declined to make GHG
emission reduction commitments for the Kyoto Protocol.
The near universal recognition of the seriousness of the
climate change challenge for the future of the world and
support for a binding international agreement to address
it were vitally important. Indeed, there would have been
a clearly binding agreement to lock in the commitments
made at the conference were it not for the ineptness
of the Danish Prime Minister who took over from the
very able chairmanship of Danish Climate and Energy
Minister Connie Hedegaard. He misinterpreted the need for
adoption of the Accord by “consensus” as a requirement
for unanimity. Thus the objection of just five countries
– Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela – was
allowed to derail the desires of virtually all the rest of
the 193 countries expressed in speech after speech
supporting such an agreement, even including the US and
China. There is even an active debate among legal scholars
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as to whether the Accord can be considered “soft law” for
which countries making emission reduction and financial
commitments can be held accountable.
The fact that 130 heads of State came to the conference
and overwhelmingly spoke in strong support of an international climate commitment was also unprecedented
and is a testimony to the importance the world attaches to
addressing this issue.
Then there was the incredible outpouring of support
for a strong agreement by civil society. Representing concerned citizens and an estimated 1000 NGOs from around
the world, 45,000 attendees came to the conference, and
maintained enthusiastic support even though the Centre
could only accommodate 15,000 of them. The NGOs,
governments, international and scientific organisations,
industrial groups and others held close to 1000 “side
events” conducting panels on every aspect of climate
change and solutions. The United Nations Foundation,
Climate Action Network, Environmental Grantmakers’
Association and others conducted briefings on climate
issues and the status of the conference by many of the top
experts and negotiators. There was incomparable energy
and enthusiasm.
Another very important accomplishment was the
uniting of the AOSIS organisation of small island States
and the Most Vulnerable States’ organisation. Pace Law
School and the Yale School of Forestry, under the leadership of Professors Roy Lee and Robert VanLierop, had
collaborated with them in devising a strategy to use their
In a press conference following the Summit, the Spokesperson
for the UN Secretary-General said that “the accord reached in
Copenhagen was an important step forward”.

leverage to strengthen the agreement and to assure that
their dire needs for adaptation help were met, largely
ignored at the previous climate conferences. While
drastic, their action in shutting down the plenary for more
than a week and at one point walking out of the conference
with the African countries, was very effective in making
the conference address these needs. As one after another
pointed out, the island States and many of those most
vulnerable stand to lose their countries, their homes and
their livelihoods if GHG emissions are not effectively
and sufficiently limited. Thus they had little choice but
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to take these drastic actions, and they succeeded in
getting agreement to establish immediately a US$10
billion short-term adaptation fund, growing to US$30
billion in 2010–2012 for which full funding was
committed, and growing aspirationally to US$100
billion a year by 2020; though the donors to the latter
fund were not identified, Secretary Clinton did commit
the US to paying its fair share. They also obtained a
commitment in the Accord requiring consideration of
establishing emission reductions to limit temperature
increases to 1.5°C (350 ppm) in the first reviewing
period in 2015.
The conference adopted the goal set by the IPCC
scientists for holding temperature increases to 2°C (450
ppm), requiring a 40 percent global emission reduction
below 1990 levels by 2020. Little press attention was given
to the quite substantial GHG emission reductions toward
that goal which were committed at the conference. The
European Union made by far the largest commitment of
20 percent below 1990 levels and were very aggravated
that other large emitters committed to much less and
that no binding agreement was reached; EU industry is
very concerned that the cost requirements of meeting

Eroding summit

their much higher goals will cause them a competitive
disadvantage and job losses. The US committed to a 17
percent emissions reduction, but only below 2005 levels,
equating to just 3 percent below 1990 levels. President
Obama was under great constraint for fear of undermining
Senate passage of climate legislation if he agreed to more
stringent reductions than are in the pending House and
Senate legislation; this dilemma was generally recognised
and the US did make a very substantial US$3.6 billion
commitment towards the short-term developing country
adaptation fund. China and India made emission reduction commitments for the first time, of 40–45 percent and
21–25 percent respectively below 2005 levels, but only
of emissions intensity, not emission levels; Brazil 21–25
percent below 2005 levels; Mexico 50 percent below
2000 levels; S. Africa 34 percent below current levels; S.
Korea 4 percent below 2005 levels; and Japan 25 percent
below 1990 levels. These commitments were included in
the Accord with a provision for inclusion of greater and
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additional commitments in the Accord with a deadline of
30 January.
Very significantly, the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) found that these
commitments would reduce 2020 emissions by 11–22
percent and that the costs of achieving these goals would
be only 0.15 percent of gross domestic product.
One of the most important accomplishments of the
conference was agreement on the architecture and funding for the REDD programme (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and forest Degradation), including agreed
measures for monitoring, reporting and verification.
A total of US$30 billion dollars was agreed to be paid
by developed countries to get forest conservation off to
a fast start.
The US and China finally agreed to verification
agreement formulae, and there were also commitments
for technology development and transfer to developing
countries, a black carbon reduction programme by the US,
continuation of the negotiations in the IPCC Long-term
Cooperative Action Working Group and Kyoto Protocol
Working Group, and guidance on reforming the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) programmes. There was no
agreement to include Carbon Capture
and Storage as a CDM measure, calling
instead for more research on leakage
and permanence of sequestration. The
Accord also considers gender issues,
recognises the needs of indigenous
people, and considers the roles of
marine issues and environmentally
based adaptation measures.
In conclusion, while the conference
did not achieve a clearly binding agreement or emission reductions satisfying
the IPCC requirements to avoid catastrophic global temperature increases,
it did make enough progress on which
to build such an agreement in Mexico
Courtesy: Financial Times
in November 2010, the date for the
next Conference of the Parties meeting. As Chair Connie
Hedegaard put it, there was no point in getting depressed:
“What we need to do is to secure the step that we took and
turn it into a result…”
President Obama and Premier Wen of China emerged
as the key leaders in saving the Accord. There were some
very unfortunate conflicts between the US and China along
the way, but at the end both agreed on the urgency and
support of a strong climate agreement.
The success of the conference was well summed up
by President Obama in stating:
For the first time in history, all major economies have
come together to accept their responsibility to take action
to confront the threat of climate change. We’re going to
have to build on the momentum that we’ve established
here in Copenhagen to ensure that international action to
significantly reduce emissions is sustained and sufficient
over time. We’ve come a long way, but we have much
further to go.
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